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Theories of Capitalism Put to the Test: Introduction 
to a Debate on Central and Eastern Europe 
Katharina Bluhm ∗ 
Abstract: »Kapitalismustheorien auf dem Prüfstand. Eine Einführung in die 
Debatte um Mittel- und Osteuropa«. The present debate on the varieties of 
capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe is marked by two different theoretical 
strands, both of which highlight the integration of the region into overarching 
discourses, and the end of the transformation research which has been current 
until now. On the one hand, the attempt has been underway with some time to 
apply the Varieties-of-Capitalism (VoC) approach; on the other hand, the de-
pendency and world-system theory is undergoing a renaissance, and taking a 
critical stance vis-à-vis VoC. But the strengths and weaknesses of both strands 
can be seen as complementary. East Germany no longer plays a role in this 
discussion, since it is a debate related to nation-state entities. In the concluding 
part of this paper, an attempt is made to show that despite no longer being a 
national economic unit, the consideration of the new East German states is still 
a useful exercise. Their integration into the world economy can be read as an 
extreme “dependent market economy” case, and helps us at the same time to 
understand the regional dimension of the debate. 
Keywords: Varieties of capitalism, dependency and world-system theory, Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, East Germany. 
Introduction 
Up until the start of this millennium, the discussion on the changes taking place 
in western capitalism and research on the emerging market economies in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe ran along very separate lines. For a long time, the proc-
ess of transformation from planned economy to market economy was consid-
ered as so particular that it seemed not to fit any “western” categories. Rather, 
it was discussed in terms of older theories and concepts, such as Weber’s no-
tion of “political capitalism”, introduced by Jadwiga Staniszkis in 1990 as one 
of the first interpretations of the transformation processes using theories of 
capitalism. But the situation has changed completely now as the transition is 
officially over, at least for the new EU member states (World Bank 2008, 42); 
in recent years, an exciting merging of discourses can be observed, in which 
Central and Eastern Europe are not only test sites for existing western theories, 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Katharina Bluhm, University of Osnabrück, Department of 
Social Science, 49069 Osnabrück, Germany; email: katharina.bluhm@uni-osnabrueck.de. 
 198
but are offering conceptual challenges to any simple transposition or applica-
tion of these frameworks.  
Two theoretical strands are of particular importance here. Firstly, that of the 
attempt to apply the “Varieties-of-Capitalism” (VoC) approach, which began 
around the time of the Central European countries’ entry into the EU. It was no 
coincidence that scholars at the same time began to work with the dependency 
and world-system theory. This was in part a completion but also in part a sharp 
critique of the attempt to apply the VoC approach. The coexistence and compe-
tition of the two theoretical strands is indicative of a fundamental dispute on 
the results of the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (and beyond), in 
which at present dependency theory seems to hold the upper hand. This is due 
not only to the existing inconsistencies and contradictions in the application of 
the VoC approach to Central and Eastern Europe, but also to the fact that it has 
little to offer to the analysis of the effects of the financial crisis in the region. 
Dependency theory explanations, on the other hand, do have something to offer 
here, as will be shown by the following contributions to this volume. Neverthe-
less, the explanatory strengths of both theories are complementary and there-
fore not simply substitutable one for the other. Indeed, it is possible that expla-
nations based on the dependency theory are facing a turning point, which may 
lead to a deeper integration of the two perspectives. 
In my contribution to the debate, I want to characterize the two strands, 
thereby working through the fundamental dispute and showing that Central and 
Eastern Europe provides for both, in different ways, a difficult, but stimulating, 
test case, as it exposes their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
While in transformation research East Germany was still a topic for com-
parison, these two theoretical strands show little interest in the German region, 
which is understandable given that both the VoC approach and dependency 
theories are aimed at entities based on the national state, which in the East 
German case was dissolved with German reunification. I will nonetheless pose 
the question as to whether and to what extent East Germany fits the debate I 
outline in the paper. This means, without denying the differences, raising some 
arguments that speak for the comparability with Central and Eastern Europe. 
The paper concludes with a short summary. 
“Varieties of Capitalism” in the East 
Scholars who work with the VoC approach either refer to the qualitative typol-
ogy of market economies1 that Peter A. Hall and David Soskice have offered in 
                                                             
1  Hall and Soskice (2001) differentiate between a coordinated market economy and a liberal 
market economy, using four areas to create the typology, areas in which economic actors 
must coordinate their activities and which are differently structured by the corresponding 
institutions: a) company financing and control; b) cooperation between companies and the 
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their much-discussed article from 2001, or they adopt a quantitative design 
close to the one suggested by Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich (2004). In 
this design, “strategic coordination” is presented on a linear continuum from 
low to high. 
Clemens Buchen (2006) and Magnus Feldman (2006) were among the first 
to try to transfer VoC to Central and Eastern Europe using a qualitative re-
search design based on maximum contrast. Taking as their starting point the 
dichotomy between liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001), they argue that only Estonia and Slovenia can in any clear way 
be classified as belonging to one or other category: Slovenia with a coordinated 
market economy (CME), and Estonia the clearest expression of a liberal market 
economy (LME), and even these two countries do not fit into the models in all 
respects. All other European countries lie somewhere in-between. But neither 
do they fit into the other “varieties” which have been developed in recent years 
in critique of the liberal vs. coordinated dichotomy. They do not match the 
“etatist capitalism” of France (Schmidt 2003) nor the “South European capital-
ism” (Amable 2003), which, like the new EU members, owes its primary com-
parative advantages to price competition. South European capitalism is charac-
terized, however, by a traditionally high level of state intervention and 
continued high level of employment protection, at least for core workers, this 
latter element being protected by a marked and continued culture of street 
protest. At the same time, the differences between the individual countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are so great that it is difficult to speak of an 
overarching version of “post-transitional capitalism”, even when one limits this 
to the new EU members. For the VoC approach, the existence of institutional 
hybrid is itself not a problem, given that it expressly foresees such cases. But 
what does the VoC approach have to offer in such cases? 
While the qualitative research focuses mainly on the “most advanced” tran-
sition countries, scholars who measure using quantitative methods try to in-
clude a great number of post-communist countries and therefore apply the 
approach also to non-EU-member post-socialist states in Europe and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS). One of the most informative volumes 
on this subject is still that edited by David Lane and Martin Myant (2007).  
The most obvious outcome of these endeavours are the contradicting classi-
fications depending on which indicators are introduced to operationalise strate-
                                                                                                                                
creation of common standards; c) the regulation of labour relations c) the supply of required 
qualifications (skills). While coordinated market economies are marked in all of these areas 
by an ex-ante strategic coordination between economic actors, liberal market economies 
achieve coordination more through “arm’s-length” market relations or hierarchies. In spite 
of the ideal-type comparison, Hall and Soskice classify individual Western countries by 
these types for the 1980’s and 1990’s. Thus Germany, Japan and the Scandinavian coun-
tries are considered as variants of coordinated market economies, while the USA appears as 
the prototype of the liberal market economy. 
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gic coordination (see table 1). Some scholars qualify Poland, Hungary, Slova-
kia, Bulgaria and Estonia as liberal, for example (cf. Knell and Srholec 2007), 
while others determine Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as 
(more state-led) “continental type of market capitalism” (Lane 2007) that 
comes close to the coordinated market economies of Hall and Soskice. David 
Lane (2007) even disagrees with the widespread classification of Estonia as 
liberal, mainly because of its little developed capital market, which represents a 
crucial feature of liberal market economies. To some, Belarus appears to be a 
highly coordinated market economy, more coordinated than France or Ger-
many, while others perceive the country simply as a state-economy (see table 
1). Russia is often called a liberal market economy, while Lane premises much 
more precisely that it is a “hybrid” of state and uncoordinated market econo-
mies. Some scholars qualify Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Estonia 
as liberal, for example (cf. Knell and Srholec 2007), while others determine 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as (more state-led) “conti-
nental type of market capitalism” (Lane 2007) that comes close to the coordi-
nated market economies of Hall and Soskice. David Lane (2007) even dis-
agrees with the widespread classification of Estonia as liberal, mainly because 
of its little developed capital market, which represents a crucial feature of lib-
eral market economies. To some, Belarus appears to be a highly coordinated 
market economy, more coordinated than France or Germany, while others 
perceive the country simply as a state-economy (see table 1). Russia is often 
called a liberal market economy, while Lane premises much more precisely 
that it is a “hybrid” of state and uncoordinated market economies. 
While the different operationalisation of the VoC approach in the quantita-
tive and qualitative research designs explains part of the puzzling outcomes, 
there are serious theoretical problems that are hardly reflected in the attempts to 
adapt the VoC approach to Central and Eastern Europe. These problems refer 
to both research designs but in a different way and degree. 
The first problem caused by this mode of model transfer is the ignorance of 
a basic assumption of the VoC theory, which was designed for the developed 
world of capitalism and not for all the existing versions of market economies. 
Hall und Soskice draw a limit first of all with membership of the OECD; but 
even the OECD member Mexico is explicitly excluded by them as unsuitable 
for their approach, “because it is still a developing nation” (Hall and Soskice 
2001, 21). 
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Table 1: Collection of VoC typologies for Central and Eastern Europe based on 
quantitative indicators 
Authors Typologies Indicators 
Lane 
(2007) 
(more state-led) continental type 
of market capitalism: Slovenia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia 
Hybrid state/market uncoordi-
nated capitalism: Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova, Russia  
Etatist economies: Belarus 
Private sectors share of GDP, 
privatisation index, stock-market 
capitalisation and provision of credit, 
participation in global economy, 
income inequality 
Knell and 
Srholec 
(2007) 
Strategic coordination: Belarus, 
Ukraine, Slovenia, Croatia, Roma-
nian, Czech Republic, Uzbekistan 
(Liberal) market coordination: 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Russia 
Coordination index: social cohesion 
(GINI, highest marginal personal in-
come tax rate, government final con-
sumption expenditure), regulation of 
labour market (World Bank criteria), 
business regulation (World Bank cri-
teria for start ups, insolvency, proper-
ty registration, stock market relative 
to banking sector in the financial 
system) 
Cernat 
(2006) 
Anglo-Saxon: Estonia 
Continental: Poland, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania 
Developmental state: Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovenia 
But in most countries with a signifi-
cant degree of institutional incoher-
ence. While the cluster analyses also 
subsumed Romania to the continen-
tal type, the case study revealed 
Romania as a unfortunate sort of 
cocktail capitalism of the two mo-
dels and the legacy of state-centred 
clientelistic capitalism during the 
1990s 
Dominant type of labour bargaining, 
state intervention, the role of the ban-
king sector and financial institutions, 
degree of internal institutional co-
herence 
Hall and 
Gingerich 
(2004) 
Liberal vs. coordinated for devel-
oped market economies (west and 
south Europe, USA, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan) 
Coordination index: Minority share-
holder rights, dispersion of control 
(by shareholders), size of stock mar-
ket, level of wage coordination, la-
bour turnover, degree of wage co-
ordination 
 
The conceptualisation of the VoC approach as a theory for most advanced 
modern capitalism rests on the underlying assumption of a rational state inde-
pendent from economic actors, and vice versa. In the sociological system the-
ory, this is coined as “functional differentiation” and as the existence of a We-
berian bureaucratic state. Strategic coordination serves as a means to solve 
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collective action problems in an open global economy beyond market and 
hierarchy, while the institutions of liberal economies force radical innovation 
through flexible capital and labour markets. Strategic coordination in advanced 
market economies as understood by the VoC approach has not much to do with 
state planned economies, nor with political corruption, clientelism, state cap-
ture and mafia-like networks. The comparative advantage that economic actors 
gain from the coordinated market economy is an advantage that – according to 
Hall and Soskice (2001) – companies use to specialize in international labour 
division and to compete on global markets. Although strategic coordination 
may also include some sorts of protection from world markets – and in fact 
does, if we consider, for example, the traditional cross ownership and interlock-
ing directorships between German banks and big manufacturing companies2 – 
rent-seeking is not a crucial advantage over competitors here. Without the 
limitations in the concept of coordinated market economy to advanced capital-
ism, one could raise vis-à-vis the VoC approach the same criticism as was once 
made to Robert Putnam: The “dark side” of social capital remains out of the 
spotlight. 
The linear classification of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe con-
ceals important differences in the relationship between economy and state and 
in the quality of statehood, in the sense of a rational-bureaucratic administra-
tion. In transformation research, clear limits are drawn on this point particularly 
between the Visegrad Four (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland) 
on the one hand and the post-socialist countries grouped together in the Com-
munity of Independent States (CIS) on the other, limits which disappear in the 
quantitative research model in particular. Thus, Lawrence P. Kind and Ivan 
Szelenyi (2005) describe Central Europe primarily for this reason as liberal 
systems, because here, during the transformation process, the formal-
bureaucratic capacities of the administration were maintained and even 
strengthened (see also King 2007). By comparison, in the CIS states, patrimo-
nial and neo-patrimonial systems were formed in which economy and state 
remain interwoven in clientelist networks. In short, the simple application of 
the VoC approach to the post-socialist world hides these fundamental differ-
ences rather than shedding light on them, precisely because the quality of the 
strategic coordination in these countries is not grasped by the formal indicators 
used by the approach (see table 1). 
The second problem with a simple application of the VoC approach has to 
do with the influence on developing market economies of international actors: 
international economic organisations (IMF, World Bank); multinational corpo-
rations; and the European Union. Here also there is a considerable difference 
between Central Europe and other post-socialist countries. The focus, however, 
                                                             
2  Until the reform of corporate law at end of the 1990s, the German state supported these 
national networks with tax incentives. 
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has shifted, in that what is now in question is the applicability of the varieties 
approach to the advanced market economies of the first EU accession wave.  
On this issue, we must again distinguish between the consequences of the 
region’s rapid integration in western transnational value-adding networks and 
the role of international organisations, in particular the EU, which are inti-
mately connected. The VoC approach tends to treat the market economies and 
their national institutions as autonomous entities in international competition 
and in the international division of labour; and although the globalisation of the 
goods and financial markets is stressed as an important and far-reaching influ-
ence, the level of the national institutions is still considered decisive. This view 
of international competition is related to its limitation to developed market 
economies, which are the home countries of large multinational corporations as 
well as being their host countries, and do not compete in the world market 
primarily on the basis of low labour costs or raw materials. Their comparative 
advantage is based on knowledge-based and capital-intensive industries and 
branches, and for the products of which the world market is relatively open. 
The VoC approach therefore takes into account primarily countries with privi-
leged market positions. 
This is precisely where the critique by dependency and world-system theo-
rists begins of the unreflective expansion of the VoC approach. With the appli-
cation of this method to the market economies of Central Europe, a decisive 
commonality between these countries is lost to sight: since the end of the 
1990’s at the latest, in particular advanced Visegrad Four countries have 
adopted what was, at least until the financial crisis, a successful growth strat-
egy, based on the continual inflow of western capital and which attracted above 
all the cost-motivated transfers of production facilities in technologically “ma-
ture” branches. Multinational corporations for the most part solve their financ-
ing problems without recourse to the indigenous financial institutions in the 
host countries and often bring their suppliers with them from their home coun-
tries. 
Along with this goes the takeover of the banking sector in most of the new 
EU member states, which has led, here, to a level of transnationalisation which 
is extraordinary for the western variety of capitalism (including the Southern-
European variety) (see the papers by Lane, Vliegenthart, Drahokoupil and 
Myant in this volume). A national interweaving of banks and industry, as was 
long characteristic of the German coordinated market economy (CME) and 
which seemed at first to be taking shape in the Czech Republic after the mass 
privatisation decided on by the Vaclav Klaus government, was then dissolved 
in the continued privatisation and internationalisation of the banking sector (cf. 
Windolf 1998; Myant 2003; Bluhm 2007). 
On top of this comes the massive and ambivalent influence of the EU: it has 
on the one hand strengthened the rational-bureaucratic capacities of the acces-
sion states through the application of the Acqui Communitaire (Bruszt 2002; 
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Merkel 2007). It encourages Public-Private-Partnership relationships between 
economy and state in the Western model as well as social dialogue in labour 
relations (Iankova 2002; Bluhm 2007), which means the use of strategic coor-
dination on the basis of a rational-bureaucratic state. 
On the other hand, in its pressure for continued liberalisation of the market 
and privatisation of in particular the steel, telecom and banking sectors, it has 
driven rapid transnationalisation and considerably reduced the scope of action 
of national economic policy, and this even before the countries join the com-
mon currency (Grabbe 2006; Kutter and Trappmann 2006). This exacerbates a 
problem, which is a subject of discussion for West-European countries also, 
namely the increasing institutional incompleteness of the national level, in 
opposition to which the transnational governance regime is gaining in impor-
tance. But while in Western Europe this process is meeting with established 
systems of national institutions, and even the Southern European countries had 
long time spans in which to adapt before and after entry into the EU in the 
1980’s, the Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe is a part of the 
genesis of the very institutions in question. This development throws light on a 
further premise of the VoC approach: Hall and Soskice start from the assump-
tion that national institutions remain decisive, in spite of globalisation and 
Europeanisation. The importance of national institutions for enterprise strate-
gies is equally treated not as a variable, an object of research in itself, but as a 
constant. Unless the VoC approach is opened up to the multi-level analysis of 
strategic coordination, as has been already called for, it cannot grasp the spe-
cific conditions of the formation of national capitalisms in Central and Eastern 
Europe.3 
The renaissance of dependency theories 
The second direction in today’s Central and Eastern Europe research more or 
less rejects the VoC approach, while distinguishing between three or four large 
blocs of countries – first round new EU-member states; Russia, Rumania and 
the CIS; and China and Vietnam. Scholars following this line of argumentation 
stress precisely the degree and mode of external pressure on the path towards 
market economies and focus on the relative position of the economies in the 
globalised world. In the European debate, the centre of interest is usually CEE, 
which has quickly become liberalised, privatised, and opened up to western 
investors. In this strand, one can distinguish between a more sociological ar-
gumentation and a more politico-economical one. 
                                                             
3  On this debate, see Hancké, Rhodes and Thachter (2007), and Crouch and Voelzkow 
(2009). 
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The sociologists King and Szelenyi (2005) have coined the Central Euro-
pean type “capitalism from without” in contrast with “capitalism from above” 
(Russia, Rumania) and “capitalism from below” (China, Vietnam) focusing on 
a combination of transition path (shock vs. gradualism), elite constellation, 
capital inflow, the emergence of a domestic capitalist class and the relationship 
between state and private economy. In this respect, “capitalism from without” 
represents the liberal dependent type of capitalism with a relatively high elite 
turnover, high capital inflow, an export-oriented manufacturing sector domi-
nated by multinational corporations, and with a state capable of providing 
“adequate public goods”; while the informal sector is medium (King and Sze-
lenyi 2005; King 2007). 
Other scholars such as David Lane and Arjan Vliegenthart in this volume re-
fer to Wallerstein’s world-system theory. Vliegenthart conceptualizes the “de-
pendent market economy” of the Visegrad states as a specific variation of capi-
talism in addition to LME and CME, while Lane adapts Wallerstein’s concept 
of core, peripheries and semi-peripheries to Central and Eastern Europe in a 
way that completely breaks with his own former attempts to test the VoC ty-
pology on post-socialist countries. 
It is this connecting of national and transnational dynamics that is the 
strength of this approach. The dependency and world-system theory challenges 
the idea of an autonomous national-institution-building in CEE and points to 
the strong influence of transnational organisations, structures and actors. It 
explores the risks and limits of the foreign-led mode of enterprise modernisa-
tion and economic growth; hereby the different exposures to the recent finan-
cial crisis across the post-socialist world become visible. And the challenge is 
most telling there where the application of VoC seems to work best: in the most 
advanced new EU-member states. According to Lane, the new EU member 
states have become “dependent satellites” of the (still dominant) “hegemonic 
bloc” (USA, UK, Germany, Japan); in contrast, most of the CIS with continued 
high state ownership are not fully integrated into the world economic system, 
forming a new semi-periphery. Only Russia and China with their large domes-
tic economic base have the potential to build a “countervailing power” (see 
more Lane and Vliegenthart in this volume). 
However, the long-term consequences of foreign-led or dependent capital-
ism for CEE are not spelled out yet. Here, too, more research and theoretical 
work is needed. In my view, the current debate demonstrates a weakness in the 
approach in three points: 
First, the dependency literature for CEE highlights the differences between 
the Visegrad Four, the Baltic states or Rumania and Bulgaria from the point of 
view of the nature and extent of the foreign direct investment (FDI) attracted. 
Therefore Arjan Vliegenthart limits his “dependent market economy” to Hun-
 206
gary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.4 At the same time, Lane in this 
volume makes it clear that the transnationalisation of the national economies of 
Bulgaria or Estonia is no less significant, and he counts them also among the 
“dependent satellites”. While the Czech Republic and parts of Slovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland have succeeded in attracting large scale direct investment in 
the area of industrial durable consumer goods, above all in the automobile 
industry, a very different type of investment and development underpins the 
high level of transnationalisation of Bulgaria and Estonia. Béla Greskovits 
(2005) has classified the countries’ leading manufacturing sectors from the 
point of view of investment and export profiles (see also Bohle and Greskovits 
2007b). According to this classification, Slovenia and the Visegrad Four have 
specialized in “heavy-complex” and “light-complex export industries”, i.e. in 
branches that are either physical-and-human-capital-intensive (chemicals, 
machinery and equipment, road vehicles and transport equipment) or are char-
acterized only by a relatively high human capital intensity (pharmaceuticals, 
office and data processing machines, electrical machinery, scientific equip-
ment, optical goods, clocks). The automobile industry plays a central role; it 
has established a Central European production cluster that includes West and 
East Germany, the Czech Republic, parts of Slovakia, Central Hungary and 
Western Poland. This sector has observed a very rapid upgrading in the last ten 
years (cf. Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2009), and there are few signs that the 
financial crisis will negatively affect the cluster in a lasting way. On the con-
trary, Opel wants to close a plant in Belgium, not in Poland. 
By comparison with this, often the predominant industries in the Baltic 
states and Southern European countries are “heavy-basic” and “light-basic”, 
which are either only capital intensive (physical capital intensive) (e.g. food, 
non ferrous metal, iron and steel) or else require either significant physical or 
human capital (e.g. wood, textile, clothing, furniture) (Greskovits 2005). Even 
if this division of labour cannot be considered stable, there is much in favour of 
Bob Hancké and Lucia Kurekova’s conclusion that catching up will be very 
difficult, as “the initial wave of investment in CEE as a whole seems to have 
produced network externalities which imply that complex manufacturing in 
future is likely to locate where other companies with a similar profile are lo-
cated” (2008, 21). 
Michael Landesmann (2008, 28) from the Economic Institute in Vienna 
(WIIW) notes “hardly any deficit in high-technology or in high-skill industries” 
for the most advanced countries of the new EU Member States, while “for 
Bulgaria, Romania and some Baltic States such deficits still exist”. And al-
though deindustrialisation has been massive in all the countries, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland have suffered comparably less than 
                                                             
4  On the social costs, see in particular Bohle and Greskovits 2007a. 
 207
CIS countries or East Germany. Poland even managed to have a slight reindus-
trialisation in the most recent years. 
In short, the difference in levels and types of dependency and transnational-
ity among the new EU member states are so significant that it is highly unlikely 
that the countries share the same dynamic and lock-ins suggested by the de-
pendency theory. Although dependency theorists are aware of these differ-
ences, their conceptual consequences have not yet been worked out. 
Secondly, Jan Drahokoupil and Martin Myant show very clearly in their 
analysis (in this volume) how different the growth models were before the 
crisis among the CEE countries, and that, in spite of their generally high levels 
of exposure to the world market, the effects of the financial crisis vary greatly. 
According to this argument, it was not the transnationalisation of key industries 
including banks that in itself led to a particularly severe exposure to the crisis, 
but rather a specific interplay of growth, welfare state models and political 
decisions. While the Baltic states and Hungary were massively affected by the 
crisis, Poland is the only EU country that in 2009 can show a positive GDP, 
and the Czech Republic has come off a little better in 2009 than Germany. 
Thirdly, with dependency theory, the analysis of institutions is too much of 
a background element. This is all the more surprising given that in economic 
development research the quality of the institutions is seen as of decisive im-
portance. The securing of basic institutions such as property rights and contract 
law is seen as guaranteed in the advanced market economies of CEE – not least 
through the inflow of FDI and under pressure from the EU. Instead, the analy-
sis of institutions is limited to arguments in support of the thesis of a wide-
ranging conformity with the needs of foreign investors. Political and institu-
tional idiosyncrasy, as well as differences in culture and industrial history, 
disappear as the “needs” of the investors appear uniform. Thus the provision of 
industrial “skills” by the state, for example, which, combined with the low 
wages, constitutes the decisive comparative advantage of “dependent market 
economies”, is taken as a given. And yet the vocational training systems, in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, have followed different paths since this 
activity was taken away from the former state enterprises, a difference which 
can be explained by the continued effectiveness of the respective industrial and 
institutional traditions of pre-1945. The influence of investors on this process 
was neither homogenous nor particularly decisive, because, among other 
things, the Western multinational corporations act differently depending on the 
institutional character stemming from their respective home countries.5 Some-
                                                             
5  On the contradictory development of Poland and the Czech Republic, see Bluhm 2007. 
While in the Czech Republic the reform of the vocational training system to include com-
panies had become an issue already at the end of the 1990’s, in Poland the trend towards a 
strengthening of “medium-level qualifications” has only caught on in recent years. Before 
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thing similar can be shown regarding the form taken by the labour-relations 
system. 
In a word, while the application of the VoC approach to CEE we have out-
lined allows the specific positioning of CEE in the international and European 
division of labour to go unrecognized, the dependency approach pushes into the 
background the analysis of the institutional conditions of action of enterprises 
(and the differences therein). It is exactly by so doing that it can work out the 
central commonalities of the advanced CEE countries. For the future dynamic 
and development of these market economies, it will, however, be of major 
importance to what extent, for example, the high level of industry-specific 
skills inherited from state socialism can be reproduced and whether systemati-
cally involving the transnational corporations in the cost of skills production 
will be successful. And it will be at least equally as important whether individ-
ual states will manage to bring forward an economics and innovations policy 
which can go beyond tax incentives and other advantages for foreign investors’ 
large-scale projects. 
How East Germany fits? 
East Germany doesn’t fit into this debate at all, at least at first sight. For the 
national-state level stands at the centre of the analyses of both theory strands. 
Moreover, a very different growth model had been in evidence here that 
worked at least for a few years after unification. Following a particularly rapid 
and profound collapse, came an externally induced economic recovery through 
German-internal state transfer payments, driven primarily by infrastructure 
projects and the construction sector. Once this model was exhausted, it led to 
massive overcapacity in this sector. The ensuing high unemployment figures 
disguised for a long time the slow recovery in the manufacturing sector (IWH 
2009, 202). There are nevertheless some remarkable commonalities with the 
CEE countries, which relativise the particularity of the East German case. 
Moreover, the absence of autonomy for the national state throws up questions 
in the debate about varieties of capitalism in CEE, which have not yet been 
clearly articulated. 
In my view, East Germany can be interpreted as an extreme case of the “de-
pendent market economy”, although one can hardly speak of “foreign-led” 
following German reunification. Yet, a closer look reveals quite similar fea-
tures in its path to a market economy. Unification implied rapid market liber-
alisation and even quicker privatisation than in neighbouring countries, in 
which large companies only managed to survive as part of the global value 
                                                                                                                                
that the education system had been strongly geared towards the encouragement of general 
academic skills. 
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chains of western multinationals. The “distinctive coordination mechanism” is 
marked here also by a high level of “dependence on intra-firm hierarchies 
within transnational enterprises” (Vliegenthart in this volume). Operations 
centres, with which large research centres are often still associated, are almost 
completely absent from East Germany.6 
The ownership structure is, therefore, not so different from that of Hungary, 
the Czech Republic or Slovakia, although there might be less new wealth in 
East Germany. Here, too, most of the small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are run by domestic owners who already had a management career 
prior to 1989 (Martens 2008; Bluhm and Martens 2010). In East Germany, 
manufacturing SMEs are even a central characteristic of the enterprise sector. 
While in the former West German states 56.2% of the turnover in the process-
ing industry is from companies with more than 500 employees, which is unique 
in European context (Bluhm and Martens 2010), the large East German com-
panies account for only 39.3% of total turnover, companies which are, as we 
have said, generally subsidiaries with headquarters outside the region (IFM 
20047). 
The new East German states produce mostly intermediate goods, and so do 
not organise their markets themselves (IWH 2009, 22). Although exports have 
been rising for the past number of years, West Germany is still the main sales 
area for East German products and services. Therefore the export ratio is mark-
edly lower than in most other new EU member states (ibid, 205). Approxi-
mately 80% of East German exports in the processing industry are accounted 
for by producers of intermediate goods and capital equipment, and are in fact 
concentrated in the branches that Greskovits (2005) has called “heavy-
complex” and “light-complex export industries” (cf. Federal Statistical Office 
2008).8 When we include “exports” towards West German states, the ratio 
improves significantly. According to estimates from the Instituts für Wirtschaft 
Halle (IWH)9, in 2008 two thirds of the turnover of enterprises located in East 
Germany was created in other regions (IWH 2009, 61). 
The monetary union within Germany has to this day had the effect of a mas-
sive increase in labour costs in East Germany by comparison with other new 
EU members, while at the same time labour productivity lagged noticeably 
behind that of West Germany. This put the East Germans, in terms of wage unit 
                                                             
6  And studies at the sectoral level indicate quite similar patterns of behavior of the parent 
companies in East German and Visegrad-Four subsidiaries, especially when these parent 
companies stem from the automobile sector and are located in West Germany (cf. Keune et 
al.). 
7  Institute for Small and Medium-sized Business Research Bonn. 
8  In spite of the strong expansion, the export ratio in the New East German states shortly 
before the crisis, measured by export of goods in relation to the GDP, at 22%, was only half 
as high as in the West German states (IWH 2009, 38). 
9  Halle Institute for Economic Research.  
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costs, at a considerable price-competitive disadvantage in both directions – 
with a comparable availability of skilled employees. This cost disadvantage 
decreased with regard to the Visegrad Four up to 2006; but above all to West 
Germany. Since the year 2000, the state-supported modernisation of production 
equipment, pay-rate moderation on the part of employees, and the departure of 
East German SMEs from collective wage agreements, have, with other factors, 
led to a situation where the rise in labour costs has remained successively lower 
than the rate of growth in productivity. In this way wage-unit costs came to 
constitute a price advantage by comparison with the old West German states 
that remains the case today (ibid, 57). Like the Visegrad Four, East Germany 
competes as a newcomer in the western world markets and in the area of com-
plex industrial goods with a combination of skilled work and, in comparison 
with Western European locations, low labour costs.10 In 2008 the GDP per 
capita in East Germany, at slightly over 20,000 Euros (after purchasing power 
parity), was lower than that of Slovenia and just over that of the Czech Repub-
lic, with the second-highest GDP-share among the new EU members (EU-15 
over 25,000 Euro) (ibid, 22). 
With East Germany, however, it is the regional perspective that is most to 
the foreground, and it is this perspective which is most critically analysed in the 
debate on the VoC approach. The critique is made above all when the regional 
institutional solutions and coordination modes are of a different nature from 
what the national type would lead one to expect or when the national institu-
tional level is weak. Thus, Crouch et al. (2009, 658) state: “Local specialisms 
that depart from the logic of a national system in this way suggest that the 
nation state is not necessarily always the most important level for determining 
the institutional environment of business.” 
Research on the transfer of institutions from West to East Germany comes 
to the clear conclusion that the new East German states deviate from the Ger-
man post-war model in important areas. This is true not only for the corporate 
governance structure of the dependent large companies dominated by “intra-
firm hierarchies”.11 Intensive research has been done above all on the system of 
collective wage bargaining, which in spite of the expansion of employers’ 
associations and trade unions from West to East has largely lost its function 
and importance as a standardizing and regulating element. Among the reasons 
are, as in CEE, the “almost complete demobilisation of the working class” 
                                                             
10  The proportion of the labour force in East Germany with a formal training qualification, is, 
due to the GDR legacy, and the high level of ethnic homogeneity, higher than in West Ger-
many (71% as against 66%) (IWH 2009, 104). 
11  In the financing of SMEs, the East-West difference in manufacturing SMEs is no longer of 
any great importance. The traditional bank loan is still the most important form of external 
financing in the West as well as in the East for this sector. However, the relationship be-
tween banks and SMEs has changed greatly in general in recent years (cf. Bluhm and Mar-
tens 2008). 
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(King 2007, 313), and employers’ lack of interest in wage-rate agreements, but 
also the departure of East German SMEs from such agreements due to the 
explosion of labour costs after monetary union. With that, the employers’ asso-
ciation (and indirectly also the unions) lost an organisational advantage they 
had over their CEE counterparts due to the transfer of existing West German 
associations and the support of the Treuhandanstalt (the organisation set up to 
aid in privatisation of state enterprises in East Germany between 1990 and 
1994) that had advised their portfolio companies to join the employer’ associa-
tions (cf. for example Artus 2001, Schmidt et al. 2003). 
In the area of vocational training, the state took on a greater role in the 
1990’s than had been foreseen in the German dual system based only partly on 
state schools but also on a practical training share within companies which pay 
their apprentices a salary. For in this domain also the transfer of formal institu-
tions did not guarantee its reproduction by the economic actors, in particular 
when these institutions relied on a high level of voluntary collective bargaining 
and corporatist coordination, as in the German version of the CME. The mas-
sive deindustrialisation on the one hand and the ready availability of highly 
qualified skilled employees for the remaining East German companies at a time 
of high unemployment led to a situation in the 1990s of a lack of training 
places, which the state tried to rectify with state-funded places outside the 
companies (cf. Grünert and Wieckert 2005).12 At the same time, “institutional 
innovations” were taking place in the form of training associations (Aus-
bildungsverbünde), in which several companies share the practical side of the 
training and the costs; schools, communities and regional development agen-
cies are also sometimes involved. Therefore such associations fell within the 
logic of the corporatist tradition of the German CME and they became also 
widespread in West German states (cf. Buss and Wittke 2006; Bluhm 1999). 
But precisely since the institutions and arrangements of the German CME 
have undergone massive changes during the 1990s, in which the integration of 
East Germany can be seen as one driving force (cf. Streeck 1997), it is no 
longer possible to understand this development simply as a “deviation” from 
the West German institutional structure. Moreover, East Germany is far from 
being able to be treated as a single region. One can, in brief, say that the dein-
dustrialisation of East Germany has almost completely destroyed the attempts, 
in the planned economy, to develop those regions which were traditionally 
relatively weakly industrialized. The present-day centres of industry in Thurin-
gia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt are the traditional centres of industry from pre-
1945, in which during state socialism modern industrial branches (e.g. electron-
                                                             
12  At present, the situation in the training market is changing so dramatically that because of 
the changes in demographics, the generational change within companies and the continuing 
emigration of young East Germans, a massive lack of skilled workers is expected and in 
some areas is already making itself felt (cf. Lutz and Wiekert, 2008). 
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ics) were also mostly located. Within this overall picture, the current region of 
Saxony-Anhalt was traditionally marked by the presence of predominantly 
large companies (chemicals and mechanical engineering), while Saxony and 
above all Thuringia were remarkable in pre-1945 in the high concentration of 
SMEs, which in the planned economy were administratively but not spatially 
integrated into larger combines (Kombinate) (cf. Bluhm 1999; 2000). This 
structure has been renewed on a smaller scale since 1990, and, as well as this, 
these states have been best able to attract investors due to the high concentra-
tion of industry, the well developed infrastructure in research and development, 
and the availability of qualified skilled employees. Therefore, in the southern 
East German states the number of companies is higher than in the other East 
German states, and yet the average firm size in these latter states is smaller than 
in, for example, Saxony-Anhalt (cf. table 2).13 According to estimates from the 
IWH (2009, 148), in 2007 the cities of Chemnitz (14.5%) and Dresden (14.9%) 
held third and fourth place in the eight German cities with the highest rates of 
employment in processing industry. This proportion is just above that of 
Düsseldorf, Hamburg and Dortmund and only those of Stuttgart (22.4%) and 
Munich (19.3%) are markedly higher. Even if the importance of research-and-
development-intensive branches is still low in Saxony and Thuringia, again 
there is a clear North-South divide.14 Note also that the basis of East German 
R&D lies in SMEs (cf. table 2; Legler et al. 2004; Konzack et al. 2006).15 The 
divide we have outlined here also has consequences for the strategic coordina-
tion of economic actors, visible above all in vocational training or in the mem-
bership of enterprise associations and in the creation of clusters. In Central and 
Eastern Europe these differences are presumably much starker, given that for-
eign investors, even in the Visegrad Four, limit their activities to a few regions, 
especially in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, and that any internal balancing 
mechanisms between the regions are much less developed than in Germany. It 
is above all for the VoC approach that this raises questions of institutional 
heterogeneity, which is not easily reconciled with an emphasis on the level of 
national institutions. Thus, the relationship between supranational, national and 
                                                             
13  Berlin is not included here. 
14  However, Berlin accounts for around 40 % of the research and development personnel 
capacity of the East German economy, and is one of the most intensive research agglomera-
tions in Germany (Legler et al. 2004, 8).  
15  Konzack et al. (2006, 20-22) found that in East Germany in 2004 (excluding East Berlin), 
73% of the R&D personnel and more then 80% of the R&D expenditures were located in 
the processing industry, mainly in Saxony, followed by Thuringia (though some way be-
hind). While in West Germany 82.8% of the R&D personnel were employed in large com-
panies (and 17.2% in SMEs), in East German states SMEs account for about 70% of the 
R&D staff (15,006 employees in absolute numbers) and almost 50% of the R&D expendi-
tures (reference year 2005). Hence, the positive development rests markedly on the East 
German SMEs, mainly in Saxony, Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt. 
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regional level of institution building and change in CEE needs to be further 
explored.  
Table 2: Manufacturing industries in the German area states (Flächenländer), 
ordered by number of companies, 2007 (1998) 
 Number of 
companies 
Employees in 
thousands 
Turnover 
in mio. € 
Turnover 
in € per 
employee 
Patents per 
100,000  
inhabitants 
NRW 10,076 (10,429) 1,287 (1,520) 351,258 282,407 43 (94) 
Baden-W. 8,260 (8,857) (1,245) 1,226 301,693 241,355 140 (105) 
Bavaria 7,226 (8,294) 1,194 (1,189) 329,644 271,567 108 (97) 
Lower 
Saxony 3,715 (4,215) 510 (560) 174,070 364,645 42 (38) 
Hesse 2,917 (3,257) 411 (470) 100,719 248,789 44 (69) 
Saxony 2,812 (2,656) 241 (211) 56,311 231,053 24 (23) 
Rhineland-
Pal. 2,093 (2,276) 280 (312) 80,002 286,699 31 (52) 
Thuringia 1,737 (1,531) 151 (117) 29,340 188,800 26 (28) 
Saxony-An. 1,394 (1,262) 122 (103) 37,581 306,074 15 (15) 
Schleswig-
Hol. 1,248 (1,483) 126 (143) 32,869 267,723 21 (24) 
Branden-
burg 978 (1,116) 89 (93) 21,989 249,878 14 (17) 
Meck.-Po. 717 (556) 58 (44) 13,834 230,681 11 (12) 
Saar 528 (527) 97 (107) 25,233 276,969 28 (27) 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, German Patent Office (grey=New East German states) 
Summary 
At the latest, the EU accession of the most advanced CEE countries in 2004 
marked the end of the transformation research that saw the region as separate 
from the dynamics in the West. The integration of the region into the debate on 
the varieties of capitalism has built a bridge between discourses which were 
previously separated, the consequences of which must still be teased out. The 
two research strands described here are the major approaches via which the 
CEE was integrated into this discussion the recent years. The first strand, with 
its application of the VoC approach, takes into account institutional variance in 
the new market economies. However, the institutional inconsistencies and 
historical particularities make any ordering into existing typologies difficult, no 
matter its level of complexity; the transfer of the VoC approach from a typol-
ogy for the developed market economies to one for the real world of capitalism 
has not been sufficiently reflected upon, as regards either method or theory. 
The second group of authors more or less rejects this procedure, precisely 
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because it disguises the overarching particularities of CEE by comparison with 
Western market economies, and because the attempt to apply the approach 
takes little account of the massive influence of external actors on the formation 
of institutions, and of the high levels of transnationalisation in the economy, in 
particular in the financial sector. The capitalism of the region is here consid-
ered primarily in categories of independence and centre-periphery, and the 
institutional analysis remains in the background. Both approaches thus demon-
strate complementary strengths and weaknesses. Which of the two perspectives 
gains in importance in the future will depend largely on to what extent CEE can 
be considered as presenting a homogenous figure on the European “semi-
periphery” in the long term. For Poland (the western region) and the Czech 
Republic, this is doubtful. 
East Germany in the future will also not play an important role in this de-
bate. But the comparison with CEE is nevertheless useful. On the one hand, 
this is because it shows that the problems in East Germany, in spite of Ger-
many’s particular history, its “Sonderweg”, are quite similar. On the other 
hand, East Germany remains a fascinating case because it can be seen as a 
radical variant on the “dependent market economy”. This form of world-market 
integration and the high costs of de-industrialisation have irreversibly reduced 
and changed East Germany’s industrial capacities. Whether they have led to a 
dead-end in terms of economic development is still a more open question than 
one might suspect when looking at the many comparisons made with the south-
ern Italian Mezzogiorno. This question must in any case be answered from a 
regionally differentiated perspective. The East German case shows, however, 
that in any focus on transnational companies, the development potential of the 
existing SMEs will be of decisive importance in CEE, and that the debate on 
theories of capitalism in this region must, when possible, pay more attention to 
them. 
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